Training Deliberative Monitors for Black-Box Scheming Detection
As autonomous agents become more capable of performing real-world tasks, distinguishing scheming behavior from benign task pursuit may become a central AI control problem. Existing monitors often rely on chain-of-thought access or internal activations, or use prompted frontier models, all of which can be unavailable, unreliable or expensive in deployment. In this work, we study action-only deliberative monitors: smaller open-weight models trained to detect scheming and sabotage from agentic trajectories without accessing the monitored agent's reasoning or model internals. Our method, inspired by deliberative alignment, uses a scheming specification to elicit structured rationales from a frontier teacher, filters them with a separate judge, and distills the highest-quality rationales into open-weight monitors with supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning. We train on five datasets, and evaluate across six out-of-distribution agentic misalignment benchmarks. We show that applying our method to Qwen3.5-27B yields higher performance than all low-cost frontier models as prompted monitors (Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite, GPT-5.4 Nano, and Claude Haiku 4.5) and than Gemini 2.5 Pro, while also achieving lower marginal inference cost (token-metered USD per 1,000 evaluations). Stronger prompted frontier monitors (Gemini 3.1 Pro, GPT-5.4, Claude Sonnet 4.6, and Claude Opus 4.6) achieve higher performance but at roughly $16$--$34\times$ higher marginal inference cost. Several of our trained monitors are positioned on the empirical cost--performance Pareto frontier among the monitors we evaluate, providing practical low-cost, low-FPR alternatives to prompted frontier models.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Tasks
Reinforcement LearningSimilar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Constitutional Black-Box Monitoring for Scheming in LLM Agents
Safe deployment of Large Language Model (LLM) agents in autonomous settings requires reliable oversight mechanisms. A central challenge is detecting scheming, where agents covertly pursue misaligned goals. One approach t…
Stress Testing Deliberative Alignment for Anti-Scheming Training
Highly capable AI systems could secretly pursue misaligned goals -- what we call "scheming". Because a scheming AI would deliberately try to hide its misaligned goals and actions, measuring and mitigating scheming requir…
DeceptGuard :A Constitutional Oversight Framework For Detecting Deception in LLM Agents
Reliable detection of deceptive behavior in Large Language Model (LLM) agents is an essential prerequisite for safe deployment in high-stakes agentic contexts. Prior work on scheming detection has focused exclusively on …
Scheming in the wild: detecting real-world AI scheming incidents with open-source intelligence
Scheming, the covert pursuit of misaligned goals by AI systems, represents a potentially catastrophic risk, yet scheming research suffers from significant limitations. In particular, scheming evaluations demonstrate beha…
Training Agents to Self-Report Misbehavior
Frontier AI agents may pursue hidden goals while concealing their pursuit from oversight. Alignment training aims to prevent such behavior by reinforcing the correct goals, but alignment may not always succeed and can le…