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Training Deliberative Monitors for Black-Box Scheming Detection

2026-05-28 · Aditya Sinha, Akshat Naik, Victor Gillioz, Simon Storf, Kilian Merkelbach, Rich Barton-Cooper, Axel Højmark, Marius Hobbhahn arxiv

As autonomous agents become more capable of performing real-world tasks, distinguishing scheming behavior from benign task pursuit may become a central AI control problem. Existing monitors often rely on chain-of-thought access or internal activations, or use prompted frontier models, all of which can be unavailable, unreliable or expensive in deployment. In this work, we study action-only deliberative monitors: smaller open-weight models trained to detect scheming and sabotage from agentic trajectories without accessing the monitored agent's reasoning or model internals. Our method, inspired by deliberative alignment, uses a scheming specification to elicit structured rationales from a frontier teacher, filters them with a separate judge, and distills the highest-quality rationales into open-weight monitors with supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning. We train on five datasets, and evaluate across six out-of-distribution agentic misalignment benchmarks. We show that applying our method to Qwen3.5-27B yields higher performance than all low-cost frontier models as prompted monitors (Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite, GPT-5.4 Nano, and Claude Haiku 4.5) and than Gemini 2.5 Pro, while also achieving lower marginal inference cost (token-metered USD per 1,000 evaluations). Stronger prompted frontier monitors (Gemini 3.1 Pro, GPT-5.4, Claude Sonnet 4.6, and Claude Opus 4.6) achieve higher performance but at roughly $16$--$34\times$ higher marginal inference cost. Several of our trained monitors are positioned on the empirical cost--performance Pareto frontier among the monitors we evaluate, providing practical low-cost, low-FPR alternatives to prompted frontier models.

📄 PDF Abstract BibTeX arXiv:2605.29601

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Reinforcement Learning

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